



Is Wealth A Loan? “The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantinidis Equi-Harmony Point”- The Queen’s Evidence Argument

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	ABSTRACT
<p>2016 Research Leap/Inovatus Services Ltd. All rights reserved.</p> <p>DOI: 10.18775/jibrm.1849-8558.2015.42.3004 URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.18775/jibrm.1849-8558.2015.42.3004</p>	<p>In this article, an alternative “wealth” approach is attempted, based on the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” and its equi-harmony point hlp. The concept of the equi-harmony point, is related with the hypothesis that “wealth is a loan” that, the rest community provided to people who are rich, in a given time moment. This model facilitates the efforts for the sensitization process been understood As a 3-ple poles model between A-B bargainers and the Community, the “C” factor, creates the conditions for a better welfare all over the world The article begins with the assumption that the wealth that one possesses is nothing more than nothing less than a loan granted to him by society and the environment of this society. This capital has an interest rate this is the work that one does, the management and its ability to continuously generate a larger capital-loan</p>
<p>Keywords: Compulsory interest- donations and benefits, Loan, Capital, Labor market, The Interest of Wealth</p>	

1. Introduction

The market-bank writes this additional capital into its assets Banks-as it is known- are interested more, to write a new loan than to payoff This “radical idea” based on this reversal in any bargain is examined in the frame of Nash Bargaining Theory (1950) and its famous Nash Solution, toward the SENSITIZATION PROCESS for a global “social welfare” based on the “wealth-loan” perception, and can coexist with the capitalist economic model, if and only if it will prepare the “Sensitized Citizen Identity (SCI)That presupposes a continuous process of Sensitization, in a world base An example of this global sensitization process is given by the world question of natural environmental protection, or even in the “no-smoking campaigning” This work intends to approach the bargaining problem by the extension of the Nash Equilibrium (win-win) so that a new bargaining (win-win-win) Equilibrium the will be The “Pareto optimality in a 3D space according to which ,the 3 players (the COMMUNITY included), form a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off Finally , the “Queen’s Evidence” strategy could be applied, for wealth-loan’s game interpretation: two people who reflect or react

between wealth-loan This situation is examined by the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’.

Fundamental assumptions

- ✓ The wealth that one owns: a loan given to him/her by the community - the global community
- ✓ It must be returned to the community (the world society), by its interest
- ✓ Work, as compulsory interest- donations and benefits as optional interest
- ✓ The bigger the loan from society, the higher the interest to be paid to the society
- ✓ In a post-capitalist society, communities will be rather private - they will have the ability to accumulate capitals as a commonplace of human inquiry
- ✓ the capital that a person holds independently, whether it arises from him/her self or his/her family (heritage), is a loan which the rest of the society has given him to survive in dignity and to raise his/her children
- ✓ Labor market is the BANK, where people exchange wealth (loan) and labor (the interest of wealth)

The objective is to prove that

1. "social welfare" based on the "wealth-loan" perception, and can coexist with the capitalist economic model, if and only if it will prepare the "Sensitized Citizen Identity (Sci)
2. That presupposes a continuous process of Sensitization, in a world base An example of this global sensitization process is given by the world question of natural environmental protection, or even in the "no-smoking campaigning"
3. If it is true, then it will be feasible a social welfare policy in a new world that will not resemble the current (centralized structure).
4. This work intends to approach the bargaining problem by the extension of the Nash Equilibrium (win-win) so that new bargaining (win-win-win) Equilibrium the will be necessary in a New, Sensitized World - (NSW).
5. The "Pareto optimality in a 3D space according to which, the 3 players (the Community included), forms a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off.
6. This work intends to prove that "wealth-loan concept" can coexist with the capitalist economic model The perception of any interaction between people, local communities, organizations, states, forces players-members, including the Community (The Intermediate Community- the "C" factor), in cooperation in a 3D space.

2. Methodology.

This work intends to approach the bargaining problem by the extension of the Nash Equilibrium (win-win) so that a new bargaining (win-win-win) Equilibrium that will be found out: Here is a table with aims and methodological tools.

Table 1

nr	Aims to be proved	tools
1	Social Welfare Wealth-loan: New Equilibrium	Sense-Profit Maximization
2	Utility function –profit maximization	Marginal economics
3	Bargaining Behavior	Nash-Cournot Equilibrium
4	Wealth-loan conceptualization	Calculus: Converging Sequences ^{1,2}

Source: Papakonstantinidis, 2019

3. Data Analysis

As the logo of the "Customer Value Foundation"(CVF), we focus our research in a triangular relation as follow: society-customer-business.




Figure 1: Queen’s Evidence

Suppose a limited amount for sharing money, between A-B.

	Strategy A	Strategy B
Strategy A	50-50	80-20
Strategy B	20-80	0,0

Strategy A: each of them has the dilemma to take a loan for future wealth, working more years but increasing other’s respect and confidence, time-to-time.

Strategy B: each of them has the dilemma to take a loan for instant wealth, without work, but – losing time-to-time the confidence, from other people.

Now, we can see that:

Even if society view the (50-50) situation is the best for them as a society, for each of them the (80-20), and (20-80) are preferable. Finally, if they think entirely selfish, then the worst solution (0,0) will be resulted.

As in the “prisoners’ dilemma”, individual expectations overcome the cooperation’s possibility, and this is the main problem today.




Figure 2

¹ In mathematics, a sequence is an enumerated collection of objects in which repetitions are allowed. Like a set, it contains members (also called elements, or terms). The number of elements (possibly infinite) is called the length of the sequence

² A sequence is "converging" if its terms approach a specific value as we progress through them to infinity.

How to combine them?

$$\binom{n}{k} = \frac{n!}{k!(n-k)!} = \binom{4}{2} = \frac{4*3*2*1}{2*1(4-2)!} = \frac{24}{2*2} = 6..differend.ways$$

	Strategy 1	Strategy 2
Strategy 1	Wealth-loan[1,3]	Wealth-interest[1,2]
Strategy 2	Wealth-work[1,4]	

	Strategy 3	Strategy 4
Strategy 3	Interest-loan[2,3]	Loan-work[3,4]
Strategy 4	Interest-work[2,4]	




Figure 3

Source: Papakonstantinidis, 2019

3.1 Interpretation

One of the many (sometimes, arbitrarily) interpretations that can be given to the results of Matrix is the separation between what each individual seeks and how they want society as a

whole. For example, the best combination for private interest is (wealth-interest) without the "labor" factor being interfered, while for society as a single set of private interests, the preferred combination is "loan-work" without the interest rate.

All other combinations represent intermediate situations, sometimes more, sometimes less "sensitized". For example, the combination of (wealth-loan), to recognize that the wealth it "owns" is not exactly its own, but rather a loan that gave it the society in which it lives (today, with globalization, we would call the "global society") is more sensitized than the combination (interest-work). For the society, the < means more preferable S2< S1 < S3 <S4.

4. Discussions

According to Ramzi Suleiman (2017) (...while a harmony point is not an equilibrium in the formal definition referred to above, it constitutes a critically stable state. The first player can increase her utility by keeping a larger portion of the total amount than the one prescribed by the harmony point, but this will result in decreasing the satisfaction level of the second player, who might reject the unfair offer...).³ ..Instead of assigning the monetary pay-off, x, as the argument of the utility function, we assign as an argument the variable x/a, where a is the individual's aspired pay-off in the interaction. As such, the proposed utility function is a measure of the player's level of satisfaction, Ramzi Suleiman(2017) showed that the proposed theory yields excellent predictions of the offers observed in ultimatum bargaining and the requests in the sequential common pool resource (CPR) dilemma game. His solution also predicts several unexplained findings,. Strikingly, he found that the predicted opening demand in the alternating offers game is also equal to the Golden Ratio. From all these notions, the two approaches- Souleiman-Papakonstantinidis⁴ converge in the note that Bargaining Equilibrium (the Market Side) is no longer accepted definitely Maybe "Harmony" (Ramzi Suleiman 2017) could be considered to be the important factor in a bargain Our concept includes both (the Nash Equilibrium and the Suleiman "Harmony", under a New Word "Equi-Harmony"= $hlp=1,888$

5. Conclusion

A previous research showed that : A triangular form (a) State, (b) Company, (c) Customers is possible under the above conditions can co-exist with the capital system: each of us has both: rationality and evolution co-exist: Individual Profit is combined with the NEW, in market.

The product of individual ordinal utilities becomes maximum when the product of marginal utilities tends or is equal to zero,

³ Ramzi Suleiman(2017) "On gamesmen and fair men: explaining fairness in non-cooperative bargaining games, rsos, 2017

⁴ The 888 triangular approach: The "win-win-win papakonstantinidis model (2002/8/14) VISBY, SW summer-school

as there is nothing else to be added such as to increase personal or individual satisfaction beyond the existing level.

The product of individual ordinal utilities becomes maximum when the product of marginal utilities tends or is equal to zero, as there is nothing else to be added such as to increase personal or individual satisfaction beyond the existing level.

A new equilibrium, the “equi-harmony” help between the ‘market equilibrium’(NE) and the “economic harmony” (Souleiman,2018) is suggested “The Win-win-win Papakonstantinidis Model” is a “tool of consent” useful in socio-economic human (and not only) relations Using this tool, a decent answer can be given to Arrow’s impossibility theorem. “The Win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (2002, August, SW) may, thus, transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash Theory) in a new – three poles-equilibrium point, including the community (Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain.

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