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Corporate social responsibility in bargaining solution by the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”

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International Journal of Innovation and Economic Development
Volume 5, Issue 3, August 2019, Pages 28-34


Corporate social responsibility in bargaining solution by the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”, for Customer, Business and Society (CBS) – RESEARCH: environmental protection

DOI: 10.18775/ijied.1849-7551-7020.2015.53.2004
URL:

Leonidas A. Papakonstantinidis

Professor Emeritus in Political Economy worked at the Local Government Dept (exPresident) of the School of Management and Economics (ex Director) , Technological Educational Institute, University of PELOPONNESUS

Abstract: This work deals with the Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) as an application of the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”-the social wellbeing, bargaining (A-B-Community) Model which leads in a more justice more equality, more faith in the state and law
Starting from Ramzi Souleiman (2013) findings, on the “economic-harmony” equilibrium, this study goes one step more, in a synthesis between market(NE) and ethical economics(Economic Harmony equilibrium), so called the “equi-harmony” –the end of the sensitization process
The suggested model’s theoretical background is analyzed as the main “interaction’s methodological tool” focusing on Utility Function

Keywords: CSR win-win-win papak model, Bargaining Theory, Nash Solution, Equilibrium

1. Introduction

Recent Researches showed that at the organizational level, CSR is generally understood as a private firm policy. As such, it must align with and be integrated into a business model to be successful. With some models, a firm’s implementation of CSR goes beyond compliance with regulatory requirements and engages in “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm
From this point of view, the importance of my presentation is focused on the “Ethical side” of business, which is the “cutting edge” of the modern capitalism This awareness generates value, especially for the consumer, in a “more social bargain” between A-B and the Community (according the suggested model: the 3-ple corner-stones customer-business-society which is main Foundation’s objective)

Since 2002-08-14-the first presentation in Visby University-SW, till now the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” seems to turn a lot of times, but remains in the same base:
Generally, the philosophy of “Action-Reaction” could be the “Theory of all”, especially in nowadays
Any living (not only human) “activity” is dominated by the “action-reaction Rule” Even the baby crying is a reaction against their parents to give more care to him/her
From this point of view, the “game theory” approach, and even more the “bargaining theory” may match to a new perception
On this “step” the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is a concept for socialized human relations, taking into consideration the COMMUNITY’s “profit” coming from any bargain between the two bargainers (A-B)

1.1 Problem Statement

“Community”-the “C” Factor participates-as a “third person”- at any bargain between 2
This participation is visible or invisible, defining the legal framework for negotiation for 2 persons involved in any bargain So far, Community involvement is invisible, neutral and ends in legislative intervention, eg labor law which defines the legal framework within the which employers and workers determine, for example, the remuneration of the latter
ends in legislative intervention, eg labor law which defines the legal framework within the which employers and workers build a relation for example, the payoff of the latter
In some of 2-persons bargains, the community participation is more visible, for example, to every 2-person financial negotiation, the Community (the State here) clearly participates in a “share” of this Negotiation However, this is not enough to describe how we imagine “community participation”
By this we mean the coincidence of the overall GLOBAL: Climate change behavior, towards the CSR Principles/free will-see at the scheme
Interaction does exist at any relation of live It’s the payoff for “dealing with” the others’ system Interaction is a kind of action that occur as two or more objects have an effect upon one another. The idea of a two-way effect is essential in the concept of interaction, as opposed to a one-way causal effect. A closely related term is interconnectivity, which deals with the interactions of interactions within systems: combinations of many simple interactions can lead to surprising emergent phenomena. Interaction has different tailored meanings in various sciences. Changes can also involve interaction As any thought , any behavior, in any place, reacts with real human needs and therefore behaviors, let me study this reaction, by the prism of strategies, mainly individual strategies In such a system, conflict is the only concluding
Suppose that any human reaction must have-it is forced to have- a social welfare step, has been launched-since 2002- an alternative price strategy approach: Any reactive, instant reflection winning strategy(DECISION) could be approached by the game theory-especially, the bargaining theory and its Nash win-win solution. [So, this let us to see human reaction as a game, especially as a part of the whole holistic equilibrium, under the [Nash hypothesis AND Pareto efficiency constraints] That is the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” Of course, the John Nash’ game –non cooperative game theory with its famous N.E gives an answer But it is not enough for a meta-capitalist global society Capitalist perception has adopted the bi-polar system of thinking (black-white, 0-1, the religious “filioque” etc In such a system, conflict is the only concluding perception
In a post-capitalist system, or inside the capitalism, a third possibility may facilitate human and not only, relations, in the base of re-action
The launched “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”, may give some new ideas for a meta-capitalist economic organization cooperative bargaining game theory” has often been concerned with whether expected bargaining outcomes could be altered by certain contractions of the feasible set. There is strong theoretical support on both sides – while there are allocation rules that require that certain contractions of the feasible set are immaterial in terms of the predicted final outcome (Nash, 1950), there are also others that suggest that those very contractions should significantly alter the predicted outcome (Kalai-Smorodinsky, 1950). Nydegger and Owen (1974) provided empirical support for the former set of allocation rules by experimentally demonstrating that certain contractions of the feasible set leave the expected bargaining outcome unchanged. Since then the ineffectiveness of such contractions has never been questioned. From this point of view, “reaction concept” meets with a number of the scientific fields as, Management, Marketing, Sociology, Decision Making, Strategy, History, folklore study, Psychology, Medicine, Biology, Biochemistry, the Science of Culture and Plants, the Science of livestock, Engineering, the Science of Electricity, Astronomy, Physics, Space Aeronautics, Philosophy, Arts, Scenography, the Art of Movie or Theatre Actors, Sculpture, Art, Painting, “Consumer Attitude, Brand Awareness, Brand Association, Perceived Quality and Brand Loyalty scales” are included in the “behavioral economics” From this point of view, it could be possible to see-alternatively-all these expressions [Consumer Attitude, Brand Awareness , Brand Association….) as a part of “reaction behavior” that matches the whole LIFE and its evolution In this frame, GAME THEORY seems to match better than any other, in your important question. A click forward, your question could be analyzed in the frame of the “bargaining theory, focusing on Nash solution-Nash Equilibrium As “competition” does not match any more to our “meta-capitalist era”, a more “socialized economic environment” in a fairer world with more equal opportunities is feasible This does not a wish, it is the reality.

1.2 Aim of the study

The presentation intends to prove that “social welfare” can coexist with the capitalist economic model but if based on a “tri-polar” (instead of bipolar) perception of any interaction between people, local communities, organizations, states, blocs Member …including the Community (The Intermediate Community- the “C” factor), in 3D space, with the community as “rainbow” synthesis/analysis It is the “rainbow concept”
If it is true, then a social welfare policy will be feasible, in a new world frame
In particular,
• to highlight the “SENSITIZATION ability” that everyone of us either relates to refugees, or in countries, whether in claiming or even in our daily transactions It is time to stop looking only personal interest or “individual defense”
• to realize the collecting, classifying and comparing the theoretical material from various sources on the functioning of Social Welfare Function (SWF), towards building a strong case with logical and coherent arguments, towards the one Triple Pole (A-B-COMMUNITY) Equilibrium (TPE), different from N.E, that leads to the Social Bargaining Solution” (SBS) and coincide with the “optimal” Community Collective Choice (CCC) in order to create a highly versatile tool, “the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” of well-formed formulas (wffs),
• To prove that a “social wellbeing” is within our grasp
• To create a highly versatile tool, “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” able to adapt or be adapted to many different functions or activities, by well-formed formulas (wffs), thus contributing in changing the 2-pole (black –white) perception, in a three pole [0,01,1] welfare cognition,
• to document the necessity and usefulness of the “win-win-win” based on incompatibilities of five classical theorems and 4 theories, as each of them exclude others
• To find a base-role for the third win (=the Community) in any bargain between 2
Focused on

  • In a post-capitalist system, or inside the capitalism, a third possibility may facilitate human and not only, relations, in the base of re-action
  • The launched “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model”, may give some new ideas for a meta-capitalist economic organization
  • The win-win perception: based on when each side of a dispute feels they have won. Since both sides benefit from such a scenario, any resolutions to the conflict are likely to be accepted voluntarily. The process of integrative bargaining aims to achieve, through cooperation, win-win outcomes
  • the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is-or, may be- an extension of the win-win model; based –not only-on when each side of a dispute feels they have won, but even more the two sides feel that their own community has also won, in the context of a social contract between them (moral contract, beyond the  strict interpretation of the Law: that’s the limit of the sensitization process toward the absolute social cohesion-the “angel’s point”

2. Definitions

  1. Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is a type of international private business self-regulation. While once it was possible to describe CSR as an internal organizational policy or a corporate ethic strategy, that time has passed as various international laws have been developed and various organizations have used their authority to push it beyond individual or even industry-wide initiatives.
  2. Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is a self-regulating business model that helps a company be socially accountable — to itself, its stakeholders, and the public.
  3. Social welfare organized public or private social services for the assistance of disadvantaged groups
  4. Well-beingwellbeing, or wellness is the condition of an individual or group. A high level of well-being means that in some sense the individual’s or group’s condition is positive. Wellness refers to diverse and interconnected dimensions of physical, mental, and social well-being that extend beyond the traditional definition of health. It includes choices and activities aimed at achieving physical vitality, mental alacrity, social satisfaction, a sense of accomplishment, and personal fulfillment
  5. Social wellbeing is the extent to which you feel a sense of belonging and social inclusion; a connected person is a supported person in society. Lifestyles, ways of living together, value systems, traditions and beliefs are all important to our social well being and quality of life.  With so many diverse cultures in our environment, there are ample opportunities to be involved in groups, programs or multicultural events.  Involvement with your own culture can be very rewarding; giving freedom to retain, interpret and express arts, history, heritage and traditions
  6. Social wellbeing involves a person’s relationships with others and how that person communicates, interacts and socializes with other people. It can also relate to how people make friends and whether they have a sense of belonging. For example, going to the movies with friends is being social
  7. COMMUNITY: By the term “Community” the “social cohesion” is described; COMMUNITY has the main role in the model Considering “Community”, then it is easy to imagine that “wealth” is no more, no less than a “loan” that Community gave to the owner of the individual wealth One of the “Community” expressions, is the well known Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)  with which the loan to the community is debited

Welfare economics focuses on the optimal allocation of resources and goods and how the allocation of these resources affects social welfare. This relates directly to the study of income distribution and how it affects the common good. Welfare economics is a subjective study that may assign units of welfare or utility to create models that measure the improvements to individuals based on their personal scales. Welfare economics looks at the distribution of resources and how it affects an economy’s overall sense of well-being.

  • Wood, Donna J. (1991). “Corporate Social Performance Revisited”. The Academy of Management Review. 16 (4): 691–718.
  • Sheehy, Benedict (2015-10-01). “Defining CSR: Problems and Solutions”. Journal of Business Ethics. 131 (3): 625–648.
  • Malhotra (of Stanford GSB); J. Dann (Jul 1, 2009). “Business Ethics Integral to Corporate Strategy, says Stanford’s Malhotra”. cbsnews.com. Archived from the original on March 18, 2017. Retrieved Aug 14, 2018. [BNET:]
  • Sheehy, Benedict (2012). “Understanding CSR: An Empirical Study of Private Regulation” (PDF). Monash University Law Review. 38: 103–127.
  • McWilliams, Abagail; Siegel, Donald (2001). “Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the firm perspective”. Academy of Management Review. 26 (1): 117–127.
  • McWilliams, Abagail; Siegel, Donald; Wright, Patrick M. (March 2006). “Corporate Social Responsibility: International Perspectives” (PDF). Working Papers (0604). Troy, New York: Department of Economics, Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute.
  • Farrington, Thomas; Curran, Ross; Gori, Keith; O’Gorman, Kevin D.; Queenan, C. Jane (2017). “Corporate social responsibility: reviewed, rated, revised”. International Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management. 29 (1): 30–47
  1. Ethical economics

 It is tried a first comprehensive treatment of the major ethical and social issues resulting from the use of ionizing radiation. It covers topics such as nuclear fuel cycles, radioactive waste treatment, nuclear bomb testing, nuclear safety management, stakeholder engagement, cleanup after nuclear accidents, ecological risks from radiation, environmental justice, health and safety for radiation workers, radiation dose standards, the ethics of clinical radiology, and the principles of radiation protection and their ethical underpinnings[1].

  • Ethical issues and assumptions underlying standard welfare economics[2].

These include:

  • the moral significance of consumers’ sovereignty, the aggregation of consumers preferences in the concept of the social welfare function;
  • the boundaries of the ‘society’ in whose welfare we are interested;
  • the relationship between GDP and some concept of ‘happiness’;
  • and aspects of distributive justice.

Moral Aggregation

  • Moral ‘Aggregation’ is the core of this work, due to its “properties”, from the following

o          Ethics or moral philosophy is a branch of philosophy that involves systematizing, defending, and recommending concepts of right and wrong conduct. The term ethics derives from the Ancient Greek word “θικός” ethikos, which is derived from the word θος ethos (habit, “custom”). The branch of philosophy axiology comprises the sub-branches of ethics and aesthetics, each concerned with values.

o          As a branch of philosophy, ethics investigates the questions “What is the best way for people to live?” and “What actions are right or wrong in particular circumstances?” In practice, ethics seeks to resolve questions of human morality, by defining concepts such as good and evil, right and wrong, virtue and vice, justice and crime. As a field of intellectual enquiry, moral philosophy also is related to the fields of moral psychology, descriptive ethics, and value theory

Comparing the “2-win with the 3-win perception

1. The win-win perception: based on when each side of a dispute feels they have won. Since both sides benefit from such a scenario, any resolutions to the conflict are likely to be accepted voluntarily. The process of integrative bargaining aims to achieve, through cooperation, win-win outcomes

the “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is-or, may be- an extension of the win-win model; based –not only-on when each side of a dispute feels they have won, but even more the two sides feel that their own community has also won, in the context of a social contract between them (moral contract, beyond the strict interpretation of the Law: that’s the limit of the sensitization process toward the absolute social cohesion-the “angel’s point”

3. Research Methodology

Paper’s Methodology is built on different approaches’ synthesis Specifically,

  • giving useful definitions
  • analyzing the bargaining problem-the Nash’s Frame
  • approaching the 3ple-folder strategies, by sequential’s limit

This work intends to approach the bargaining problem by the extension of the Nash Equilibrium (win-win) so that a new bargaining (win-win-win) Equilibrium the   will be found out, and to manipulate with Incompatibilities, by the utility theory:

  1. The impossibility theorem (1951 Kenneth Arrow: book: Social Choice and Individual Values, as well as the Amartya Sen “liberal paradox”
  2. the theorem of incompleteness (Kurt Gödel (1931)
  3. the Nash Equilibrium in Nash “Non cooperative Game Theory 1951(annals of Mathematics,1951 Vol. 54, No. 2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 286-295)
  4. The “Pareto optimality in a 3D space according to which ,the 3 players (the COMMUNITY included), form a state of allocation of resources from which it is impossible to reallocate so as to make any one individual or preference criterion better off without making at least one individual or preference criterion worse off

Pareto efficiency or Pareto optimality, is a state of allocation of resources in which it is impossible to make any one individual better off without making at least one individual worse off.

The study uses four main methodological tools, thus depended on three different aims as bellow:

nr Aims to be proved tools
1 Social wellbeing exists Kaldor-Hicks efficiency
2 Utility function –profit maximization Marginal economics
3 Bargaining Behavior Nash-Cournot Equilibrium
4 Measuring wellbeing Math sequences 

Papakonstantinidis, 2019

4. Frame and Implementation of the Nash’s NCG Theory

The base-line –as also difference from the other tri-pole conceptions, it that now COMMUNITY operates inside any negotiation between 2, as Mediator, Arbitrator, Agent (in the Principal-Agent Theory) and as Leader in the LMX theory (Leader-Member Exchange)
That’s the NEW, in human socio-economic, political, ethical…relations
That’s also the difference between human and other living been behavior difference
Introducing the “COMMUNITY” as the “total good” we created a new player with increased responsibilities in the GAME: these responsibilities are arisen in the bargain and for the bargain, thus transforming a TWO –players anticipation, in a THREE-players anticipation, thus proposing a new view in our (capitalist) system
A “win-win-win holistic proposal includes the COMMUNITY, or the “C” factor, not only as “a third player”, but more a “person” with more than one responsibilities:
This “fantastic person” [i.e a family, a neighborhood, a place, an area, a city, a town, a state, AND history, tradition, behavior code, ethic, race….” (something that produces cohesion links) MUST play a 3D responsibilities, concerning as “mediator” of all “cohesion forces”
So a new form, the form of a tri-pole reaction is launched, with the CMMUNITY –as an idea, as a local cohesion perspective (traditions, local ethical code of communication…may substitute the “hard” bi-polar conflict system
The base-line –as also difference from the other tri-pole conceptions, it that now COMMUNITY operates inside any negotiation between 2, as Mediator, Arbitrator, Agent (in the Principal-Agent Theory) and as Leader in the LMX theory (Leader-Member Exchange)
That’s the NEW, in human socio-economic, political, ethical…relations
That’s also the difference between human and other living been behavior difference
Introducing the “COMMUNITY” as the “total good” we created a new player with increased responsibilities in the GAME : these responsibilities are arisen in the bargain and for the bargain, thus transforming a TWO –players anticipation, in a THREE-players anticipation, thus proposing a new view in our (capitalist) system
Where, should big corporations be spending their CSR resources?
extend to a change in the end itself, to the reduction of profits or to the non distribution of profits among stockholders in order to devote them to other purposes.
It should be possible to “outline” some basic CSR potentials, in purpose, impact, benefits

4.1 The Win-Win-Win Papakonstantindis Model: The Concept

  1. Considered at the organizational level, CSR is generally understood as a private firm policy. As such, it must align with and be integrated into a business model to be successful.
  2. a firm’s implementation of CSR goes beyond compliance with regulatory requirements and engages in “actions that appear to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm  (Mc Williams, Abagail; Siegel, Donald 2001) and that which is required by law”
  3. From this point of view, the importance of my presentation is focused on the “Ethical side” of business, which is the “cutting edge” of the modern capitalism
  4. This awareness generates value, especially for the consumer, in a “more social bargain” between A-B and the Community (according the suggested model:  the 3-ple corner-stones customer-business-society which is main Foundation’s objective)
  5. CSR pre-supposes ethical behavior: but what is ethical behavior and how is this integrated in a bargain
  6. Starting from Ramzi Souleiman (2013), we propose CSR work  in the cutting edge between market(NE) and ethical economics(Economic Harmony equilibrium), so called the “equi-harmony”, signed by  (hlp=1.888) the end of the sensitization process

As CSR pre-supposes Ethical Behavior, each of the  2-pole bargainers, in any bargain between 2, (A-B) has to 3-pole thinking :

  • “What’s the best for me(A)”
  • What’s the best for the other bargainer (B)
  • What’s the best for the all the other people, who doesn’t participate in this bargain(The “C” factor)
 

We must imagine that any reactive decision-even the smaller one constitutes an autonomous “system” highly sensitive to initial conditions.

Focusing on the behavior of dynamical systems that are highly sensitive to initial conditions, are examined in the frame of Chaos theory

We suggest that “conditions” in a quite different field could be resulted as an impact of  any reactive behavior in any bargain , or any instant reflection’s strategy

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is based on this very small instant reflection, highly sensitive to initial conditions.

A “win-win-win holistic proposal includes the COMMUNITY, or the “C” factor, not only as “a third player”, but even  more a “person” with more than one responsibilities:

•          Mediator

•          Arbitrator

•          A trust and justice institution

•          LMX [Leader-Member-Exchange] institution

•          The Agent in the “Principal-Agent Theory”

•      The  intuitive coherence of  “We  belong in a community (family, village, town, city, nomos, province, periphery, state, unions of states…global cohesion

This “fantastic person-“C” factor [i.e a family, a neighborhood, a place, an area, a city, a town, a state, AND history, tradition, behavior code, ethic, race….” (something that produces cohesion links) MUST play a 3D responsibilities, concerning as “mediator” of all “cohesion forces”

So a new form, the form of a triple pole reaction is launched, with the COMMUNITY –as an idea, as a local cohesion perspective (traditions, local ethical code of communication…may substitute the “hard” bi-polar conflict system

By the “sensitization’s approach”, a number of parallel steps could be achieving, specifically,

  1. Steps on the ladder (ARNSTEIN, 1967
  2. CSR: Objectives and Actions: STEPS BACKWARD
  3. Types of Knowledge-Behavior resulted from the knowledge synthesis

Steps on the ladder (ARNSTEIN, 1967)

The “sensitization and involvement process, toward the wellbeing, through the interaction in the bargain (any bargain, between 2)

Types of Knowledge-Behavior resulted from the knowledge synthesis
In this table, a combination of simple forms of knowledge is given, thus new forms of behavior could be resulted

Starting from Ramzi Souleiman (2013) findings, on the “economic-harmony” equilibrium, this study goes one step more, in a synthesis between market(NE) and ethical economics(Economic Harmony equilibrium), so called the “equi-harmony” –the end of the sensitization process[1] A common finding of experiments on sequential bargaining with shrinking pies is that the opening demands of first players fall somewhere between the equality and the Sub-game Perfect Equilibrium-SPE.  prediction  As a consequence, several experimental studies attempted to probe the significance of fairness considerations in ultimatum and sequential bargaining games In the ultimatum game the subgame perfect equilibrium (SPE) prescribes that the proposer should demand the entire pie, minus an infinitesimally small epsilon  to be offered to the responder- The ultimatum bargaining[2] is based on offer-rejection” concept

Subgame Perfect Equilibrium (SPE) Experiments on bargaining games have repeatedly shown that subjects fail to use backward induction.

Prof.Ramzi Suleiman (2018) proposed an alternative model, termed ‘economic harmony’ in which we modified the individual’s utility by defining it as a function of the ratio between the actual and aspired pay-offs. He also abandoned the notion of equilibrium, in favour of a new notion of ‘harmony’, defined as the intersection of strategies, at which all players are equally satisfied. He showed that the proposed model yields excellent predictions of offers in the ultimatum game, and requests in the sequential common pool resource dilemma game. Strikingly, the predicted demand in the ultimatum game is equal to the famous Golden Ratio (approx. 0.62 of the entire pie).

  1. sequential bargaining games i.e chess

In game theory, a sequential game is a game where one player chooses their action before the others choose theirs Importantly, the later players must have some information of the first’s choice, otherwise the difference in time would have no strategic effect. Sequential games hence are governed by the time axis, and represented in the form of decision trees.

Ultimatum game a simple representation of alternating offers

• Player 1 offers 0≤x ≤M to Player 2

• Player 2 Accepts (π1,π2) = (M-x, x) or rejects

• If Player 2 rejects the offer, the pie shrinks to M’<M

• Player 2 makes offer 0≤x’ ≤M’ to Player 1

• Repeat according to number of rounds of the game

Ultimatum game

• Alternating offer bargaining where pie vanishes after 1

round: M’=0

• The offer x is a take it or leave it offer (an ultimatum)-

 

M=10

  1. Although a lot of general conclusions have been offered at this point, you can’t avoid the feeling that a large universe has been sampled at only a few, unsystematically chosen points. So an obvious next step is to systematically vary some of the variables that have been looked a in isolation—discount factors (and hence perfect equilibrium predictions), and length of game. This is straightforward to do. The only technical experimental design issue was how to vary the discount factors within members of a bargaining pair. The previous experiments had all used the shrinking pie method to induce the same discount factor for both bargainers.

Dictator and Ultimatum Game: To separate motivations of proposers and  responders: Game that is as similar to the ultimatum game as possible, but where the responder cannot express his preferences in any way. Hence eliminating motivations of responders

Ultimatum Game: Proposer proposes a division of M (10), responder accepts and division is implemented, or rejects, and M is destroyed, both agents get 0.

The Dictator Game: Proposer proposes a division of M (10), responder has to accept

In this section, the math constants combination is examined, in relation with their impact in building a new bargaining equilibrium: The equi-harmony point  in the intersection of

τhe customer-business-society cycles, responsible to the math constants 1-1,

The win-win-win papakonstantinidis model is, thus, the limit-up of a continuous sensitization procedure, at any (A-B) bargainers AND Community “C” symbolized by the three sequences’, i.e

Table: φ,π,e numerical values

,

φ=1,61803398874989484820………….

π=3,14159 26535 89793 23846 26433 83279 50288 41971 69399 37510……

e= 2, 7182818284590452353602874713527 ………..

According to Ramzi Suleiman(2017)   […while a harmony point is not an-equilibrium in the formal definition referred to above, it constitutes a critically stable state. The first player can increase her utility by keeping a larger portion of the total amount than the one prescribed by the harmony point, but this will result in decreasing the satisfaction level of the second player, who might reject the unfair offer…].[1]. ..Instead of assigning the monetary pay-off, x, as the argument of the utility function, we assign as an argument the variable x/a, where a is the individual’s aspired pay-off in the interaction. As such, the proposed utility function is a measure of the player’s level of satisfaction, Ramzi Suleiman(2017)   showed that the proposed theory yields excellent predictions of the offers observed in ultimatum bargaining and the requests in the sequential common pool resource (CPR) dilemma game. His solution also predicts several unexplained findings,. Strikingly, he found that the predicted opening demand in the alternating offers game is also equal to the Golden Ratio .

From all these notions, the two approaches- Souleiman-Papakonstantinidis[2] converge in the note that Bargaining Equilibrium (the Market Side) is no longer accepted definitely May be “Harmony” (Ramzi Suleiman 2017)   could be considered to be the important factor in a bargain Our concept includes both (the Nash Equilibrium and the Suleiman “Harmony”, under a NEW word “EQUI-HARMONY”=

 SOCIAL WELFARE could be measured by the win-win-win papakonstantinidis model:

At any case there is a constant, which has been measured by the suggested model to be the limit of the sensitization process for each bargainer, the community included:

Conclusions

1. Identification “win-win-win” as a key tool for the approach to social wellbeing by clicking on the incompatibility of five basic theorems that define it – each one of its own side-either positive (justice theorem ) or negative (the impossibility theorem)
2. The suggested “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” is built up on these incompatibilities, in particular as regards the pairs” Pareto efficiency – Impossibility Theorem” “paradox liberty (Amartya Sen) – Pareto Efficiency” , “Theorem of Justice –Pareto Efficiency” and (the most important) “the Theorem of incompleteness-the Impossibility Theorem”
3. The “win-win-win papakonstantinidis model” (2002, August, SW) may, thus, transform individual winning –instant reflection –strategies (the win-win Nash Theory) in a NEW –three poles-equilibrium point, including the COMMUNITY (Environmental Protection, Value Systems, Ethic etc), which is the “absolute cooperation” limit point in the bargain between TWO

Papakonstantinidis conjectures:
1. at any bargain between two, each one from the 2 bargainers represents the whole of the community and (at the same time) him/her self From this point of view, Community may be concerned as an aggregate entity that participates in a social welfare game. So, “what is good for the Community (the third “win”) and what is no, incorporated in each one from the bargainers’ expectations (in the frame of the “agency theory” or “the principal-agent -problem
At…any…case,the…(A-B)…BARGAINERS…and..the…Community…-as..the..3rd…player..in..the..BARGAIN
in..the..form..of….LAW,or,even..more..of..the..”contract..social”(J.J.Rousseau,..1752)
-..must..”push”…their…own…”DISAGREEMENT…POINTS..as…far…as…possible-beyond…INDIVIDUAL
EXPECTATIONS..so..to..MAXimise…their..own…profits….and..all…of…them..to..MAX..the..social..profit
If…this…will…hapen,…then…a…new…situation…will..be..resulted..even..in..dt..period:..the..Angels”..Moment
2. People have by nature, a strong trend to cooperate each-other. From this point of view, “a win-win-win situation may be possible if and only if the human mind (as expressed in terms of interaction), is built to accept this situation (the universal cooperation) bargainers think double, as separate rational units AND as “the COMMUNITY” AND
3. The problem of interaction in a bargain is transferred from the negotiators’ intentions into share’s distribution in a possible solution by agreement
a. People want to cooperate, but in the depth of their mind seek such an agreement that will give them shares such that to maximize the satisfaction of personal needs
b. This point is very important for our work : Social welfare is the product of “ordinal” (and not cardinal) individual/personal utilities (to maximize the satisfaction of personal needs)
c. The product of individual ordinal utilities becomes maximum when the product of marginal utilities tends, or is equal to zero, as there is nothing else to be added such as to increase personal or individual satisfaction beyond the existing level

PELOPONNESUS

RURAL AREA

STRATIFICATION 1-1-2018 till

31-12- 18

213 107 106

1

The sample Agribusiness

CEO

Agribusiness

leaders

marketing planners dealers Post graduate Students [MBA] Students

In marketing schools

Nr 1 7 78 112 4 11

1a

 

AGES total
18 25 34 45 77 77+
MALE 10 20 30 55 18 3 136
FEMALE 25 30 17 5 77
213
EDUCATION

LEVEL

No  Scholl Primary School High

School

Bachelor Diploma M.Sc

MBA

Ph. D SUM
12 94 77 28 2 213
 
HOUSEHOLD INCOME/

EUROS/YEAR

000

…3 ..8 …15 …30 …50..
15 42 101 55 213

2

THE QUESTIONAIRE

 

Disagree

completely

%

 

Disagree

mostly

 

Indifferent::Neither agree non disagree

indifferent

 

Agree

mostly

 

 

Agree

completely

 

 

Total

Agree

 

1.1 I work in a non well defined MARKETING SPACE [focus on NATURAL ENVIRONMENT]
1.2 New  MARKETING technologies will surely come along to solve environmental problems before they get out of hand
1.3 Some pollution is inevitable if we are going to continue to make improvements in our standard of living: marketing campaign
1.4 If business is forced to spend a lot of money on environmental protection’ MARKETING , it won’t be able to invest in research and development to keep us competitive in the international market
1.5 As an MBA student, just don’t have the time to worry about how all of my actions affect the environment
.1.6 I  think I do my (marketing) work good when I take steps to help the environment by the SENSITIZATION Method [2]
1.7 I try to pass the message that I would be embarrassed if people I know caught me not recycling my trash
1.8 A manufacturer that reduces the environmental impact of its production process and products is making a smart business decision: The NEW profile of marketing concerning the environmental protection
1.9 Local governments should provide more incentives for people to recycle: Marketing message , which I focus on
1.10 Marketing Message for environmental Protection: We should wait until the economy gets better before we make the environment a major policy priority

3

 

 

5

BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED frequencies RESIDUAL

(OBS-EXP)

(OBS-EXP)2 COMPONENT=(OBS-EXP)2/EXP
1 29 21,3 7,7 59,29
2 24 21,3 2,7 7,29
3 22 21,3 0,7 0,49
4 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29
5 21 21,3 -0,3 0,09
6 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89
7 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29
8 20 21,3 -1,3 1,69
9 23 21,3 1,7 2,89
10 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89
TOTAL 213 213

6

BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED frequencies RESIDUAL

(OBS-EXP)

(OBS-EXP)2 COMPONENT=(OBS-EXP)2/EXP
1 29 21,3 7,7 59,29 2,7835680
2 24 21,3 2,7 7,29 0,3422535
3 22 21,3 0,7 0,49 0,0230048
4 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29 0,2483568
5 21 21,3 -0,3 0,09 0,0044225
6 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89 0,5112676
7 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29 0,2483568
8 20 21,3 -1,3 1,69 0,0793427
9 23 21,3 1,7 2,89 0,1356807
10 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89 0,5112676
TOTAL 213 213 25.6 4.888….

7

BEHAVIOR OBSERVED EXPECTED frequencies RESIDUAL

(OBS-EXP)

(OBS-EXP)2 notes
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 29 21,3 7,7 59,29 2,7835680
2 24 21,3 2,7 7,29 0,3422535
3 22 21,3 0,7 0,49 0,0230048 1,618[2]
4 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29 0,2483568
5 21 21,3 -0,3 0,09 0,0044225 Max/min (61,8)[3]
6 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89 0,5112676
7 19 21,3 -2,3 5,29 0,2483568
8 20 21,3 -1,3 1,69 0,0793427
9 23 21,3 1,7 2,89 0,1356807
10 18 21,3 -3,3 10,89 0,5112676
TOTAL 213 213 4,888… 4.888/2.78

8

GRAPH:

9

10

References

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  • Nash John (1951) “Non cooperative Game Theory (annals of Mathematics,1951 Vol. ………54, No. ……….2 (Sep., 1951), pp. 286-295 Crossref
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